The hookworm epidemic on the plantations in colonial Sri Lanka. by Hewa, S
Medical History, 1994, 38: 73-90.
THE HOOKWORM EPIDEMIC ON THE PLANTATIONS
IN COLONIAL SRI LANKA
by
SOMA HEWA *
The history of disease and health in colonial Sri Lanka has been largely ignored.
Historians ofcolonial economic and social policies in that country have produced a deluge
of materials without mentioning the impact of colonial labour policy on the health of the
indigenous people.' Meanwhile, even those who have written on the history ofmedicine in
Sri Lanka have not fully accounted for colonial labour practices that had a significant
impact on health.2 This conspicuous neglect by both medical and social historians has
contributed to the prevailing notion that the medicine brought by European colonial forces
saved the lives of millions of people in the colonies.3 Instead, medicine and medical
services were introduced to the colonies for the self-interested concerns of the colonizers
themselves, and were "constrained ideologically, financially and politically from broader
and more effective involvement in the health ofthe population".4 An integrated study ofthe
history of disease and health in colonial Sri Lanka must examine the implications of
economic policies for the health of the indigenous people. Therefore, the purpose of this
paper is two-fold: first, I will examine how British colonial labour policy in Sri Lanka
resulted in an epidemic ofhookwormdisease on the plantations and in neighbouring villages.
It is argued that the laissez-faire policy of the colonial government enabled the planters to
ignore basic requirements such as the water supply and latrines forthe workers in favourof
their own economic goals. Second, I will discuss the involvement of Rockefeller
* Dr Soma Hewa is a professor ofSociology in the Department of Behavioural Sciences, Mount Royal College,
Calgary, Alberta, Canada, T3E 6K6.
I wish to thank the Rockefeller Archive Center in New York for providing funding to undertake this project. The
research was conducted in the summer of 1992. I also sincerely thank the referees of Medical History for their
valuable comments on this paper.
Lennox A. Mills, Ceylon unider British rule 1795-1932, London, Frank Cass, 1964; G. C. Mendis, Cevlaon
under the British, Colombo, Apothecaries, 1952; S. Arasaratnam, Ceylon, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1964; S. U.
Kodikara, Indo-Cellon relations sinlcse independence, Colombo, Apothecaries, 1965; K. M. de Silva, A historv of
Sri Lanika, London, C. Hurst, 1981. Although these are some of the major historical studies on the impact of
Western colonial rule in Sri Lanka, they make no reference to the health implications of colonial policies.
2 C. G. Uragoda, A history ofmedicinie in Ceylon, Colombo, Middleway, 1987. This is the only comprehensive
historical survey of disease and medicine in Sri Lanka. However, the author's failure to address the fundamental
social and economic policies ofthe colonial rule that had a far-reaching impact on the health ofthe people on the
island severely undermines the potential contribution of this volume.
' K. David Patterson, Health in colonial Ghanba: disease, medicine, aind socio-economie change, 1900-1955,
Waltham, Mass., Crossroads Press, 1981; Meredeth Turshen, The politicail ecology ofdisease in Tanzania, New
Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1984, pp. 133-53.
4 David Arnold, 'Medical priorities and practice in nineteenth-century British India', S. Asiai Res., 1985, 5:
167-83.
73Soma Hewa
"philanthropic" medicine in Sri Lanka, which came to assist the British planters but which
also served the long-term economic and political interests of American industrial
capitalism. The Rockefeller philanthropists failed to eradicate hookworm disease on the
plantations because the planters, not perceiving the relation between their own profits and
the health of the colonial labour force, did not fully co-operate with the programme.
I
The British conquered the Kandyan Kingdom of Sri Lanka in 1815, burning numerous
villages and desolating large tracts of land.5 Dr Henry Marshall, a senior medical officer of
the 89th Regiment that led the war against the Kandyan Kingdom, wrote that after such
devastation amongst the Kandyans it would be "impossible to establish a cordial or social
union with them".6 The bitterness of the war remained in the minds of the Kandyan
Sinhalese fora long period. When the British established plantation industries in central Sri
Lanka during the mid-nineteenth century, the Kandyans were unwilling to work on the
estates. The planters had no choice but to recruit labour from neighbouring India for the
year-round work on the plantations. From the early nineteenth century, Indian workers had
been employed in coffee, sugar, rubber and tea plantations in more than a dozen British
colonies. It was their labour, along with British capital, which built the overseas wealth of
Britain.7
From the very beginning, the government of Sri Lanka maintained a very clear and firm
policy towards the recruitment of Indian labour. It was argued that Sri Lanka was close
enough to India forthe planters themselves to make the appropriate arrangements to recruit
workers as their economic interests dictated. This laissez-faire policy differed markedly
from that ofother British colonies. According to the labour law in India, labourers could be
recruited only for Mauritius, British Guiana, Jamaica, and Trinidad, where the abolition of
slavery had caused serious labour shortages. The Colonial Office in London and the
colonial governments in those countries felt obliged to find replacements for the slave
labour force.8 The availability of cheap manpower in India provided the solution for the
colonial governments, which realized the importance of a free flow of labour for their
economies and became actively engaged in recruiting Indian workers for their plantations.
However, as the situation was different in Sri Lanka, the government never felt such an
obligation to its planters and therefore adopted a strong policy of non-intervention. The
inconsistency of the labour policy shows that neither the Colonial Office nor the
government of Sri Lanka acted with honesty in their handling ofthe recruitment of Indian
labour for the plantations of Sri Lanka.9
The workers were recruited in India by the estates' agents, or "Kanganies", who acted as
leaders of each group of up to one hundred workers. Kanganies took the workers to Sri
5 Henry Marshall, Ceylon: a general description ofthe island and its inhabitants; with an historical sketch of
the conquest of the colony by the English, London, William H. Allen, 1846, p. 131.
6 Ibid., p. 226.
Hugh Tinker, A newR system ofslavery: the export ofIndian labour overseas. 1830-1920, London, Oxford
University Press, 1974, p. xiii; Kodikara, op. cit., note I above, pp. 6-7.
S. V. Balasingham, The administration ofSirHenry Ward, governorofCeylon 1855-1860, Dehiwala, Tisara
Publishers, 1968, pp. 49-50.
9 K. M. de Silva, Socialpolicy andmissionary organizations in Ceylon 1840-1855, London, published for the
Royal Commonwealth Society by Longmans, 1965, p. 239.
74The hookworm epidemic in colonial Sri Lanka
Lanka, and supervised their work on the plantations. In addition to their salaries as
supervisors, the Kanganies received two cents perday from the wage ofeach labourerunder
their supervision."' A Kangany generally supervised up to one hundred labourers and he
himself would work as a labourer if the number of workers was small. Often acting as a
mediator between the management and the workers, he was "the medium of all advances
made to labourers, and he was often the sole debtor to the estate"." Further, Kanganies
received a bonus when their workers tumed up, and therefore they made every effort to
bring as many workers as possible to the plantations. This direct control by the Kanganies
and the plantation management led to widespread exploitation and abuse of the workers.
The periods of high immigration coincided with the expansion of the plantation
industries: coffee in the years between 1841 and 1880, tea from 1890 to 1910, and rubber in
the first two decades ofthe twentieth century. By the turn ofthe century (at the height ofthe
plantation economy), about 100,000 workers plus their families arrived annually in Sri
Lanka.'2 According to the 1911 census, there were about 500,000 immigrant workers
scattered over 1,900 estates in the central, southern and western provinces of the island.3
The apparent discrepancy between the census and the annual rate ofarrival is accounted for
by the high death toll and by the fact that a large number ofincapacitated workers returned
each year.'4
Workers came by boat to the northwest coast of Sri Lanka; from there they walked for
about two weeks to the plantations in the central province. The long march along
undeveloped interior jungle roads was extremely hazardous and they faced the threat of
malaria. Many workers succumbed to disease, starvation, and exhaustion on their way tothe
plantations. Those who did arrive were unfit to begin work for several days. Without warm
clothes and protection from the cool and damp climate ofthe hillside plantations, the workers
became even more vulnerable to diseases: "Few gangs of coolies arrived on the estates
without some deaths occurring on the road, but more took place after arrival on the estates,
being worn with thejourney and changes ofclimate".'5 The plantation organizations in Sri
Lanka, such as the Ceylon Agricultural Society, repeatedly requested direct government
involvement in the recruitment and the welfare of the plantation labourers. It asked the
government to establish, as a minimum, basic welfare facilities for the workers during their
long journey from India. The Society maintained that the construction of resthouses and
"' Jane Philips, 'The hookworm campaign in Ceylon', in Harvard M. Teaf and Peter G. Franck (eds), Hands.
acro.s frontiers: case studies in technzicail cooperation, Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff's, 1955, p. 274.
De Silva, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 240.
2Rockefeller Archive (hereafter RA), Sumtnnaryof nzotes oni the visit to Ceylon, 1914, pp. 1-3, RG. 5, Se. 2, Box
47.
3RA, Considerationis ofimportance in conntiectioni with the conitrol ofhookworm diseaise in Ceylon, 1914, p. 4,
RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 47. It should be noted that the sources are not clear regarding the number of womnen and
children who accompanied the labourers. Reports generally state "labourers plus their families".
'4 K. M. de Silva, a historian, provides compelling evidence for the extremely high death toll among the Indian
immigrant workers during the early phase of the plantation industries in Sri Lanka. For example, in the years
from 1841 to 1848, about 70,000 (10,000 per year) or 25 per cent of the immigrant workers died of various
causes. These figures were published in the Colomnibo Observer, a leading newspaper of the day. It argued that the
death toll in Sri Lanka was much higher than that in Mauritius, where labourers received relatively better
treatment. According to de Silva, the government did not challenge these estimated figures, thereby providing
strong corroboration of their accuracy. De Silva, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 299.
5 P. D. Millie, Thirty vear.s ago. orremniniscences ofthee( ear/v days ofcoffeeplanting in Ceylon,Colombo, A. M.
and J. Ferguson, 1878 (no page numbers in this book).
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hospitals forthe workers along the interior road to the plantations would ease their difficult
journey. Tofinance such services it suggestedthatthe government spend aproportion ofthe
money made from land sales on the welfare of the workers.'6
A large majority ofthese Indian labourerscame from the lowest social strataofthe Hindu
caste hierarchy. According to this system, people of the lower castes were expected to
undertake the most menial or despised occupations in Indian society. Because oftheir low
status at home, many of these people became willing recruits, going to the other British
colonies only to pursue equally menial occupations. They did not achieve anything by
migrating, but simply exchanged "one situation ofcasual, intermittent, poorly paid labour
for a similar situation in the new country"..'7 For almost a century, British colonial
administrators were confronted with evidence that the planting interests exploited Indian
labourers in ways which could not be tolerated by a "decent, humane society".'8 Yet the
administrators continued to defend the indentured labour system, claiming that these
wrongs were mere abuses and irregularities which were "amenable to reform". One ofthe
most common official justifications for the working and living conditions of Indian
labourers in various colonies was that their situation was not any better in India.
Improvements, it was argued, could be worked out through negotiations with the planters.
Because ofsuch prevalent attitudes in the rank and file ofthe colonial administration there
was no public outcry or abolitionist campaigns in Britain against indentured labour. The
irony was that British officials actively campaigned against the exploitative customs ofthe
Hindu caste system in India, but they turned a blind eye when it came to the deliberate
exploitation by British plantation companies of Indian labourers elsewhere. Indentured
labour was finally stopped in the early twentieth century only because ofthe opposition of
Indians themselves to the practice.19
The planters were required to provide accommodation and hospital care forthe workers.
The workers lived in barrack-like "lines" which consisted ofa double row ofrooms back to
back. Each family was given two small rooms; in one they slept, and in the other they
cooked on the floor. As many as twelve people lived in a room of 8 by 10 feet. The small
verandas of the lines were used to keep goats, cattle, chickens or any other livestock that
eachfamily owned. There were no windows in the rooms and the verandas wereboarded up
to keep out the drenching monsoon rains, apractice which also kept out much needed light.
The most unhealthy aspect of these living conditions was that the lines were not provided
with latrines; the planters maintained thatthe workers would not use them even ifthey were
built.20 As a result, the entire vicinity surrounding the lines became the repository of
night-soil and other household refuse. Hence, the sanitary conditions on the estates were
deplorable.2'
As forthe economic argument, the workers werepaid on the basis ofwork"units" similar
to that ofpiecework in factories. Ifthe workers were in good physical condition they could
"6Ceylon Agricultural Society, Proceedings, first report, Colombo, 1842, pp. 3(-1.
7 Tinker, op. cit., note 7 above, p. xiii.
18 Ibid., pp. xiv-xv.
"' P. C. Emmer, 'The meek Hindu: the recruitment of Indian indentured labourers for service overseas,
1870-1916', in P. C. Emmer (ed.), Colonialism and migration: indentured labour before and after slavery,
Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1986, pp. 187-207.
21) RA, Relief and control ofhookworm disease in Ceylon, 1918, pp. 6-7, RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 47.
2' RA, op. cit., note 12 above, pp. 1-4.
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completemore unitsofworkaday, andbepaidaccordingly. Conversely, ofcourse, workers
in poor health earned less.22 As a result ofthis arrangement, the entire family often worked
under all climatic conditions in orderto complete the assigned work units. Children started
working in the fields as early as six years ofage.23 On the otherhand, because ofthe ready
supply oflabour by the Kanganies, the planters perceived no direct economic benefit from
maintaining even the most basic sanitary requirements on the plantations let alone from
improving those conditions. Incapacitated workers could simply be replaced.
II
In the extremely unhealthy sanitary conditions on the plantations, the workers and their
families encountered awide rangeofparasitic andinfectiousdiseases. Theannual reports of
the Principal Civil Medical Officer(hereafterPCMO) on the health and sanitary conditions
ofthe island provide the rate ofinfections, hospitalization, anddeath among various groups
ofthepopulation. Hookworm disease was firstreported in the annual reportofthe PCMOof
Sri Lanka in 1888, when 31 cases were diagnosed.24 They were all immigrant labourers
from the plantation districts. As the number of reported cases of hookworm infection
rapidly increased among plantation workers, health officials became convinced that the
disease hadbeen brought by labourers from India. Consequently, forthe firsttime, the 1891
returns ofthe Registrar General ofCeylon reported that "the disease hadbeen introduced to
the island by the Indian cooly".25 Following that year, almost every annual report of the
PCMO, the Registrar General of Ceylon, the Inspector General of Hospitals, and various
other organizations, emphasized the high rate of hookworm infection among immigrant
workers. They warned the authorities in Sri Lanka that the disease was rapidly spreading
into neighbouring villages due to the poor sanitary conditions on the plantations. Although
at this time only a few cases of hookworm-related deaths were reported in the north,
north-central and eastern provinces, where there were no plantations, generally the whole
island was affected by the disease.26 Speaking to the Indian Medical Congress in 1894, Dr
Thornhill, the Senior Medical Officer of the province of Uva, argued that "Whether the
disease existed among the Sinhalese in the past time or not, I can only say that it is now
widespread amongst them in the Uva and other provinces of Ceylon, apparently mostly in
the provinces where immigrants from India areemployed".27 In 1897, the Registrar General
ofCeylon reported that out of 262 deaths registered from hookworm disease, over 80 per
cent were immigrantworkers. The report stated thatthe disease must be moreprevalent than
had been noticed by the health authorities: "There is reason to believe that mortality from
anchylostomiasis [hookworm disease] is much understated owing to the difficulty of
diagnosing the disease, and that to this disease is really due a large number of deaths now
2 RA, op. cit., note 13 above, p. 6.
2' RA, op. cit., note 20 above, pp. 4-6.
24 RA, Anchylostomiasis-Cevlon, administration reports, Principal Civil Medical Officer and Inspector
General ofHospitals, 1888 (abstracted), RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 47.
25 RA,Administration reports, vitalstatistics: reportofthe RegistrarGeneral ofCeylon, 1891 (abstracted), RG.
5, Se. 2, Box 47.
26 RA,Administration reports, vitalstatistics: report oftheRegistrairGeneral ofCeylon, 1897 (abstracted), RG.
5, Se. 2, Box 47.
27 H. Thornhill, 'Anchylostoma duodenale', Transactions of the first Indian Medical Conigress held ti St.
Xavier's College, Calcutta, 24th to 29th December, 1894, Calcutta, 1895, pp. 62-8.
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returned as due to diarrhoea, dysentery, anaemia, dropsy, debility, and fever. The disease
has been introduced into Ceylon by the Indian Cooly." Further, it stated that "it is a more
insidious and dangerous enemy than cholera and requires to be met by systematic
28 measures of prevention".
Health authorities continued to point to immigrant workers as being the carriers of the
disease. Sir Allan Perry, the PCMO, reported again in 1899 that:
This disease, like many others in the island, is brought over from India by the Malabar
coolies ... Unfortunately the disease is not confined to the hosts who bring the parasites,
but it is spread broadcast from the habits of the cooly, who pollutes the soil with his
excreta and thus affects the water supply ofothers. The disease, in consequence, is said to
be on the increase.29
In its annual report on Sri Lanka, the Mining Journal, Railway and Commercial Gazette in
1904 wamed the authorities that unless proper measures were introduced the disease
would soon reach a catastrophic level with a large number of immigrants arriving on the
island every year. It stated that hookworm disease was "constantly introduced from India
by Malabar coolies ... The disease is on the increase. There were 1,775 admissions in all
hospitals, with 272 deaths. The largest number was treated in the General Hospital,
Colombo, viz. 756 admissions with 38 deaths. A large number of cases occurs in the
planting districts".30 By 1909, the gravity ofthe situation was such that over 90 per cent of
the plantation workers had been infected and the death toll was rising.
Hookworms are tiny parasites about one-half of an inch in length. Although parasitic in
the bowel, the worms enter the human body through the pores ofthe skin when they come
in contact with soil polluted by human excreta. The victims of hookworm infection suffer
from undernutrition, anaemia and lassitude. Drained of blood, hookworm sufferers are too
weak to resist new infections, which usually cause their death.3' By the turn ofthe century,
hookworm infection was a common health problem in many of the British colonies.32
Being concerned with the ill health and the high death toll of the colonial labour force, the
British Medical Association set up a committee, that included Sir Patrick Manson and J. S.
Haldane, to study the hookworm problem in the colonies. The committee recommended to
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of Crewe, certain preventive measures
against the hookworm disease.33 Following their recommendations, on 4 February 1909,
Crewe wrote to the Governor of Sri Lanka regarding the high death toll among immigrant
workers. In this despatch, the Secretary of State repeatedly acknowledged the economic
loss for the planters resulting from the ill health of the workers:
28 RA, op. cit., note 26 above.
29 RA, Admlinistration reports, Principal Civil Medic-al Qfficer and Inspector General of Hospitals, 899
(abstracted), RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 47.
3"' RA, 'Anchylostomiasis in Ceylon', Mining Journal, Railway and Commercial Gazette, September 10, 1904
(abstracted), RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 47.
3' W. W. Cort, 'Investigations on the control of hookworm disease', Am. J. Hyg., 1921, 1: 557-67.
32 Victor Heiser, An American doctor's odyssey, New York, W. W. Norton, 1936, p. 328.
33 RA, Ceylon-sanitary and health conditions-hookworm disease, 1914, pp. 1-5, RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 47. Folder
289 contains the recommendations of the British Medical Association and despatch No. 53 of the Earl of Crewe
to the Governor H. E. McCallum on 4 February 1909.
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Having considered the reports from the several Colonies, with the observations of the
committee upon them, I recognize that the loss of labour caused by the prevalence of
anchylostomiasis is very serious, and affects prejudicially not only the employers of
labour, but the community at large. Not only is there serious loss of life, direct and
indirect, but also through the invaliding of labourers, the charges for hospitals and pauper
expenditure are largely increased. This loss is, in my opinion, largely avoidable.
Experience has shown that certain simple, well-understood, and inexpensive measures can
be adopted, which, if properly carried out, will reduce the evil effects ofanchylostomiasis
to a negligible quantity.34
Although Crewe's communique indicates concern about the problem, his reference to the
planters' economic losses reflects an inadequate understanding of the labour recruitment
practices that existed on the plantations. Moreover, his comments do not appear to have
been sufficiently forceful to compel the colonial government-already committed to a
non-intervention policy to take any direct action. Not surprisingly, Crewe's
communique did not produce any tangible improvements in the sanitary conditions on the
plantations. The Governor, H. E. McCallum, appointed a committee consisting of several
government officials and planters to recommend measures for the control of the disease,
but took no concrete action. The committee suggested basically the same measures that
had already been recommended by the PCMO, Sir Allan Perry, in 1903. 35
The government's and the planter's ability to respond to medical crises, not to mention
their priorities, is evident in the case of the fatal disease knownl as sprue. Sprue was
characterized by chronic diarrhoea affecting Europeans, but not the natives.36 The
European planting community and the colonial administration were extremely concerned
by the disease. They promptly responded with a joint effort to deal with the problem. The
Planters' Association and the government together established a fund amounting to £1,000
(£750 from the government and £250 from the Planters' Association) to carry out research.
Further indicating the level of official concern, Patrick Manson, a highly regarded
authority on tropical disease, and his son-in-law Philip Manson-Bahr, were both brought
to Sri Lanka at the Governor's request to undertake research on the disease between 1912
and 1914.37
The Planters' Association was a powerful political body which exercised a great deal of
influence on the political affairs of the country. At the outset of the hookworm epidemic,
the colonial government underestimated the political power of the Planters' Association
and tried to interfere with their business. For example, when the PCMO distributed a
pamphlet describing the hookworm infection on the plantations, the planters reacted
angrily. They observed, pointedly, that the "government has done nothing for them as to
hookworm disease for 20 years although fully conscious of the problem".38 Since the
government was unwilling to commit itself financially to affairs it had long maintained
were the planters', it purposely avoided making recommendations that might involve
capital spending and antagonize the planters further. Consequently, the recommendations
4 Ibid., p. 1.
35 RA,AnchhIosto1oi(isis-Ceylo7, inedical rel)ott oi thelie/it/li (an( sanitaos comiitiom oft/ie i./anl lfoi theyeari
emidimig Dec. 31, 1903. with the hospital retrmis. for the saooe /)erio(d (abstracted), RG. 5. Se. 2, Box 47.
-6 P. H. Bahr, A relmort oni re.searches omi sprime in CeYlon, 1912-1914. Cambridge University Press, 1915. p. 19.
31 Ibid., p. 1-2.
3x RA, op. cit., note 13 above, pp. 5-6.
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of the committee appointed by Governor McCallum tended to be superficial, considering
the current understanding of the disease. It recommended that all workers arriving in Sri
Lanka be treated with beta-naphthol until the rate of infection declined to a negligible
level. With respect to the prevention ofthe disease, it recommended that every set of lines
and its immediate surroundings be swept clean once a day and that any deposit ofexcreta
be carefully removed and buried. In addition, at least 12 feet around the lines were to be
cleared ofall vegetation; and the verandas were not to be enclosed oroccupied by livestock.
It is critical to note however, that, given the importance of latrines in preventing the
continuing spread of the disease, the committee issued no direct orders to construct them.
The language used in the report reflects the relative weight given to each of the points it
makes. In all, the report contained nine points, of which eight were explicit
"recommendations" while the construction of latrines was only "urged".39
For a variety of reasons, therefore, the effective control of hookworm disease on the
plantations was prevented by the ideological, political and economic interests of the
colonial government. The official viewpoint was that hookworm disease on the plantations
was a problem for the planters to deal with in accordance with their own economic
objectives. The planters, on the other hand, perceived no direct economic benefit from
controlling and curing the disease; they tried to maximize their profit by ignoring even the
most basic sanitary requirements of the workers.
For their part, the workers could ill afford to take time off for medical treatment which
would result in loss of wages. After taking medication, they could not work for a day or
two due to various effects of the treatment. According to Dr J. E. Snodgrass:
The most frequent complaint is of pains in the arms, legs, or other parts of the body-it is
believed that the pains referred to are in large part due to the effect of the purgative in
conjunction with the wet and fairly cold weather, and perhaps to the somewhat debilitated
condition of many of the patients. An improper and probably insufficient food supply no
doubt has a bearing on many of the phenomena.40
Because of these consequences, workers were reluctant to follow the treatment; this was
interpreted by the planters as the result of ignorance and superstition.4' Moreover, the poor
sanitary condition of their living quarters was generally attributed to the cultural character
of the people. It was argued that "the Oriental could not be sanitated; he always had lived
in filth and squalor; to persuade him to live any other way was hopeless; he was happy in
his present mode of existence and it would be a shame to disturb him".42 The poor
socio-economic condition of these labourers in India was used by the planters as the
standard for determining the services to be provided on the plantations in Sri Lanka. The
assertion that these people would not use sanitary facilities even ifthey were provided was
mainly prompted by the economic concerns of the planters. We may assume that, even
39 RA, Administration reports, /910-1911, anchylostomia.sis-Ceylon, Principal Civil Medical Officer and
Inspector General of Hospitals (abstracted), RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 47. Folder 289 contains the committee's
recommendations.
4" RA, Letter from DrJ. E. Snodgrass to the International Health Board, No. 443/17, Aug. 19th, 1917, RG. 5, Se.
1.2.
4' RA, op. cit., note 20 above, pp. 4-7.
42 Heiser, op. cit., note 32 above, p. 35.
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lacking a detailed knowledge of the hookworm's life-cycle, or "germ theory", little
encouragement would be required for a labourer to discern the value of a clean and
functional latrine. In general, neither the government nor the planters acted upon the
hookworm problem adequately, due to their own self-interested concerns. As a result, the
disease became an epidemic in many parts of the island. By 1916, as is shown in Table 1,
over 90 per cent ofthe labour force on the plantations was infected with it.43 It was under
these circumstances that the International Health Board (hereafter IHB) ofthe Rockefeller
Foundation became interested in setting up a hookworm control programme in Sri Lanka.
Table I
Hookworm infection by age in major plantation areas, 1916-1917
Total Dickoya Bogawantalawa Norwood Matale*
Age groups No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
examined 46,705 14,302 10,271 5,662 16.470 All ages infected 45,416 97.2 13,667 95.6 10,114 98.5 5,497 97.1 16,138 98.0
examined 4,821 2,331 347 972 1,171
Under6 years infected 4,242 88.0 1,970 84.5 289 83.3 881 90.6 1,102 94.1
examined 13,108 3,737 2,746 1,320 5,305
6to 18 years infected 12,778 97.5 3,660 97.9 2,696 98.2 1,309 99.2 5,113 96.4
19 to 40yeaexamined 21,711 6,803 5,903 2,741 6,264
years infected 21,424 98.7 6,660 97.9 5,861 99.3 2,694 98.3 6,209 99.1
examined 6,373 1,295 1,197 580 3,301
41 to 60 years infected 6,290 98.7 1,246 96.2 1,190 99.4 567 97.8 3,287 99.6
examined 692 136 78 49 429 Over 60 years infected 682 98.6 131 96.3 78 100.0 46 93.9 427 99.5
* Includes villages and estates' schools
Source: RA, No. 7388, Report on workfor the reliefand control ofhookwormn dise(lse in Ceyvlon, 7 September,
1918. Record Group 5, Series 2, Box 47, Folder 292.
III
The Rockefeller Foundation's involvement in the hookworm control campaign began in
the early 1900s, when the disease was widely prevalent in the southern United States.44
The Rockefeller capitalists of the North became interested in controlling hookworm
disease and increasing the productivity of the people of the backward South for the
purpose of expanding the industrial economic basis. Having successfully eradicated
hookworm disease in the South, John D. Rockefeller Sr and his ideological mentors such
as Frederick Gates, Simon Flexner, Wickliffe Rose, and Theobold Smith turned their
attention to other nations, in particular the British colonies. According to Richard
Brown,4s Rockefeller philanthropists became interested in undertaking public health
programmes in these colonies for specific economic and political reasons: 1) control ofthe
13 RA, op. cit., note 33 above, pp. 4-6.
44 R. B. Fosdick, The story ofthe Rockefeller Foundation, New York, Harper and Bros., 1952, p. 10.
4' E. R. Brown, 'Public health in imperialism: early Rockefellerprogrammes at home and abroad',Anii. J. Pub/.
Health, 1976, 66: 897-903, p. 897; also E. R. Brown, Rockefeller medicine men, Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1979, pp. 13-59.
81Soina Hewa
economic resources and markets of those non-industrialized countries was necessary for
sustained economic growth in the United States; 2) economic and political relations with
the people of the colonies would facilitate future investments of surplus capital in those
countries by industrial capitalists; 3) poor health and disease were believed to be an
obstacle to those agrarian people receiving the benefit ofcivilization. IfWestern medicine
could eliminate these diseases, the people of the colonies would be more receptive to
Western social and cultural values, making increased American economic and political
influence possible in those societies. Frederick Gates, a founding member of the IHB,
wrote to Rockefeller Sr: "all the nations and all the islands of the sea are actually opened
and offer a free field for the light and philanthropy of the English speaking people". He
went on to observe that, "Missionary enterprise, viewed solely from a commercial
standpoint, is immensely profitable... Imports from heathen lands furnish us cheaply
with many of the luxuries of life. . ..46 The IHB had its own reasons for selecting Sri
Lanka for a hookworm control programme: "Ceylon was regarded as the key to the
situation in the East, particularly for work in British colonies".47 Among the specific
reasons for selecting Sri Lanka, Wickliffe Rose, the Director of the IHB, recognized the
importance of agriculture as a viable economic medium and the country's location at a
cultural crossroads in the East which would be ideal for spreading the new knowledge.4"
When the IHB first approached them, the colonial government and the planters strongly
objected to the proposed plan to start a hookworm control campaign on the plantations.
The Governor at the time, Sir Thomas Chalmers, stated that he did not want "any Yankee
men or Yankee methods introduced; Ceylon was capable of running its own affairs and
paying for its own health work".49 However, the government and the planters were
eventually convinced by Rockefeller representatives that improved health would also
mean increased productivity and reduced absenteeism. They argued that "a healthy
labourer is an asset to an estate while an unhealthy labourer is a partial liability. It appears
economical therefore to keep labourers healthy"'.5) The representative of the IHB in the
East, Dr Victor Heiser, strengthened the argument by noting that "disease never stays at
home in its natural breeding place offilth, but is ever and again breaking into the precincts
of its more cleanly neighbours".5' As a further incentive, the IHB was prepared to bear
more than halfthe cost of the project, which neither the government nor the planters could
refuse. Also, by that time the relationship between the planters and the government had
reached its lowest point over the issue of sanitation on the plantations. Therefore, both
sides were ready to use the opportunity in order to break the deadlock. Although the easy
supply of workers continued unabated, it can be suggested that the planters had their own
reasons for wishing to improve their relations with the government.
With the approval of the colonial government and the Planters' Association, the
hookworm control programme was initiated in 1916 in a group of selected estates. The
4( RA, Letterbook No. 350, 1905, RG. 1.
47 RA, Cevlon, 1915, p. 13, RG. 1. 1, Se. 600, Box 2.
4X Philips, op. cit., note 10 above, p. 271.
49 Heiser, op. cit., note 32 above, p. 332.
50 RA, Suggested memoraindum of)procedure to c0ontrol anllohlostolniasis in CeYlon aifter the Initernitioniail
Heailth Board .s o,fficer.s ire wvithdraiwn, 1922, p. 4, RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 48.
5' Heiser, op. cit., note 32 above, p. 37.
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representatives of the IHB, Doctors J. E. Snodgrass, W. C. Sweet, and W. P. Jacocks,
developed a working plan for Sri Lanka, which would be supervised by American medical
personnel appointed by the IHB. The equipment and salaries of the American personnel
were provided by the Health Board, while the cost of local subordinate staff was provided
by the government and the plantation owners.52 Although we will later see that little came
of it, at this point the planters finally agreed to take the crucial step ofbuilding latrines on
the plantations. The government also promised to provide every legitimate assistance to
the planters to improve sanitary services. This was an important change in government
policy toward the plantation industry.53 An area of about 7 by 10 miles in the Matale
district, comprising 24 estates with a population of approximately 10,000, was selected for
the initial stages of the campaign. The programme was gradually extended to other estates
in the plantation districts. Besides the treatment of those infected, the campaign consisted
of a study of suitable types of latrines for the estates and an information campaign on the
cause and prevention of hookworm disease. This was done through lectures, distribution
of pamphlets and demonstrations. In addition, the estate dispensers were trained to
diagnose the infection using microscopical and clinical techniques, and to administer
proper doses of chenopodium oil as treatment.
By the end of 1917, the hookworm control campaign had treated about 40,000 people.
Of these, 77.9 per cent were pronounced cured upon microscopic re-examination. In the
course of examination of specimens for hookworm ova, microscopists found the eggs of
other intestinal parasites such as ascaris, trichocephalus, strongyloides, oxyuris and taenia.
A mixture ofchenopodium oil and sugar syrup was given as treatment. Morbidity statistics
were gathered from several estates which showed the improvement in general health
following the treatment for hookworm disease. The death rate declined to 7.5 per 1,000
people on the estates compared to 13.8 per 1,000 prior to the hookworm control campaign.
The District Medical Officer of Matale reported that only 2,604 patients were admitted to
hospitals in 1918, compared with 3,694 hospital admissions in 1916 before the hookworm
control programme was begun, a reduction of 27 per cent.
In spite of these improvements in the health of workers, they were not sufficient to
convince the planters to undertake the major sanitary reforms suggested by the IHB. As
has been noted, the crucial requirement for the control of hookworm disease was the
construction of latrines. Although the planters had agreed to construct latrines at the
beginning ofthe campaign, they did not honourtheircommitment. Because ofthe pressure
of the IHB, the government introduced legislation making it compulsory for all the estates
to provide sufficient latrines for the workers' lines.55 In order to comply with the law,
many estates constructed latrines using temporary materials such as cadjan and jute
bagging which did not last more than a few weeks. Therefore the persistent soil pollution
on the plantations combined with the arrival of infected new workers from India
contributed to a high rate ofre-infection. Faced with this situation the government took no
significant action. Although voicing agreement for the plan initially, the lack of real
12 RA, Workingplan for the reliefand control ofanchlostoiniasis in Cevlon, 1916, pp. 1-3, RG. 5, Se. 2, Box
48.
13 RA, op. cit., note 50 above, p. 4.
54 RA, op. cit., note 20 above, pp. 27-37.
55 Ibid., p. 8.
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commitment on the part of the planters was demonstrated by the shoddy construction of
those latrines which were built. As the Rockefeller observers reported:
In no case were the latrines in the right position. They were too far away, and not handy
enough to the lines they were intended to serve.... The latrines were also ill-constructed,
roofs too low, no drains, platforms laid on ground level instead of on a raised stone work,
and many of them rotten and unsafe.6
In 1919, three years after the completion oftreatment in Matale district, a sample of about
3,000 workers were given post-campaign treatment. Examination of the excreta of these
workers showed that there was a high rate ofre-infection among those who had been cured
in 1917. As shown in Figure 1, on 33 estates ofthe district, the average rate ofre-infection
was 88 per cent, while the level ofre-infection ranged from as low as 45 per cent to as high
as 100 per cent. In all the other plantation districts the post-campaign examinations
showed high rates of re-infection.
IV
The hookworm control campaign on the plantations failed to achieve its goal because
the sanitary conditions were not improved while the treatments were being carried out.
The continued soil pollution on the estates and in the neighbouring villages created a cycle
ofre-infection which prevented total eradication ofthe disease. It became clear to the IHB
that neither the government nor the Planters' Association was seriously concerned about
the hookworm problem. Although sharing the cost ofthe programme, the government was
not fully committed to the objective of improving sanitary conditions on the estates. It did
not want to antagonize the Planters' Association by forcing them to construct latrines, nor
did it want to construct latrines on the estates as this might appear to be a change of
government policy toward the plantations. For their part, the planters believed that they
could overcome the persistent complaints against them by letting the IHB medical
personnel treat their labourers. Anything beyond that which required capital spending was
not something that they were prepared to undertake. The planters insisted that they could
not make a substantial capital outlay to improve sanitary conditions in the context of the
depressed financial situation in the tea and rubber markets following World War I. At this
juncture, the hookworm control campaign on the plantations came to an abrupt end; the
IHB felt that there was no point in carrying out treatment on the estates unless the sanitary
conditions were improved to prevent soil pollution. The complete eradication of the
hookworm disease on the plantations, according to the IHB, required the following
measures: 1) the estates were to comply with basic sanitary requirements such as the
construction of appropriate latrines in the workers' lines; 2) all new workers were to be
treated upon their arrival at the estates; 3) until sanitation was well enough established to
prevent re-infection, one round of treatment was to be repeated each year; 4) arrangements
were to be made to treat workers while they were in quarantine camps in southern India.58
On 18 January 1921, the Hookworm Control Committee met at the office ofthe Colonial
Secretary to discuss the future of the campaign. The chairman of the committee, the
5' RA, Sinitairv surv'ev, MhAitenne estalte, Kaindv district, 1919, p. 1, RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 48.
57 RA, Reliefanldl (control of hookwzorni diseaAse in Cevlon, 1920, pp. 18-20, RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 47.
5X RA, op. cit., note 50 above. pp. 3-5.
84The hookworm epidemic in colonial Sri Lanka







0 41to160 61to70 71to80 81to90 91tol1
Percentage group
Source: RA, No. 7542, Report on workforthe reliefandcontrol ofhookworm disease in Cevlon, December, 1920.
Record Group 5, Series 2, Box 47, Folder 294.
Colonial Secretary, informed the meeting that Dr Heiser of the IHB would be visiting Sri
Lanka in the near future to assess the progress of the campaign on the plantations. In the
meantime, he pointed out that the IHB had decided to stop all its treatment activities on the
estates and to resume work in the villages: "It was decided, for the present at any rate, the
campaign should be undertaken in village areas. .., but at the same time it was realized
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that there was little or no prospect of transferring such activities to upcountry estate areas
even after the arrival ofDr. Heiser".59 In April 1921, as anticipated by the government, Dr
Heiser visited Sri Lanka and confirmed the IHB's decision to stop its work on the
plantations after 1922. He met government officials, the Planters' Association and the
medical personnel of the project to discuss the future of the campaign. The project
director, Dr W. P. Jacocks, pointed out that in the context ofthe given state ofsanitation it
would be futile to continue treatment activities on the plantations:
In regard to sanitation on estates the requirements of government are comprehensive but
are not enforced to any extent. As a matter of fact legal steps are scarcely ever taken
against even the worst offenders with the result that sanitary conditions are as bad as ever
on most estates.... There was considerable opposition, of a passive nature, against the
innovation and on the majority of estates only the bare letter of law has been complied
with.60
Under these circumstances, Dr Jacocks advised that the emphasis should be shifted from
hookworm control on the estates to a comprehensive health programme, which would
include hookworm control, sanitation and other related problems, directed towards some
selected native communities on the island.
Following these consultations, Dr Heiser made several recommendations to the
government and the planters with regard to the permanent control of hookworm infection
on the estates. He made it clear that until such recommendations were satisfactorily met,
"No further regular campaigns are needed to be done on estates. Demonstrations have
already been given on approximately 1,700 estates and more than 300,000 labourers have
been treated".6' He suggested that the plantations should carry on with their own
treatments through their dispensers, as it would be more affordable to the planters and
would interfere less with their economic activities. For the first time, Dr Heiser raised the
issue that the planters should consider making an arrangement with the South Indian
government to provide treatment for the labourers before they left the quarantine camps at
Mandapam and Tatta Parri in India. His report concluded expressing disappointment with
the level of co-operation of the government and the planters: "This whole program is
based on the understanding that estates are putting forth every effort to improve sanitation
by building latrines and by getting them used. This is the most important feature of the
work. Every legitimate encouragement should be given by the government to enable
estates to conduct their own campaigns and to improve their sanitation".62
By the end of 1922, according to the annual reports ofthe project directors, the IHB had
spent $195,048 on the hookworm control campaign in Sri Lanka. The campaign had
treated a total of 413,175 individuals on the estates and neighbouring villages.63 This
included people who received one to four treatments. Costs in terms of patients
S RA, Minutes of a meeting of the anchvlostomiasis control committee held in the office of the Colonial
Secretary, January 18th, 1921, RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 48.
60 RA, European planting community'in regard to medical aidandsanitation, 1921, p. 1, RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 47.
61 RA, op. cit., note 50 above, p. 3.
62 Ibid., p. 4.
RA, Ceylon anchvlostomiasis campaigns, 1916-26, pp. 1-2, 8-9, 18-19, RG. 5, Se. 3, Box 196; Philips, op.
cit., note 10 above, p. 296.
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amounted to less than 50 cents per person. If treatments were counted as units of service,
the cost of each unit was less than 20 cents. Approximately two-thirds of the total cost of
the campaign had been spent between 1916 and 1919: this amounted to $122,538.64 The
high operational cost during this period was due to extensive preliminary examinations of
patients during the early part ofthe campaign. After 1919 the programme was modified to
reduce the cost ofexamination. Although the government shared the cost with the IHB, the
annual reports of the campaign do not provide information on the government's share.
Therefore, the above figures represent only a portion ofthe cost. The government provided
for the salaries and expenses of local subordinate staff, drugs, equipment, offices and
office supplies. The annual reports of the IHB describe the government's spending as "an
approximately equal division of the expense ofthe work".65 If that was the case, it can be
suggested that from 1916 to 1922 the IHB and the governmentjointly spent approximately
$400,000 for the hookworm control programme on the plantations.
The deaths from hookworm disease did not decline during this period. For example, out
often major plantation districts where an extensive treatment programme had been carried
out, in only one (Matale) had the number ofdeaths been reduced (by 13 per cent) between
1916 and 1919. In all the others, hookworm-related deaths continued to increase during
the campaign, with disproportionately high numbers from 1917 to 1918, which were the
years ofthe influenza epidemic. When the campaign began in 1916, an average hookworm
related death rate for these ten districts was 520, which rose to a peak of 619 in 1919.
Several explanations have been given for this increase: 1) that doctors became aware of
the disease and were making facile diagnoses, resulting in the attribution ofmore deaths to
hookworm infection; 2) a rice shortage on the plantations during World War I changed the
diet to rougher foods which aggravated the disease; 3) for the first time, an administrative
mechanism was developed to obtain accurate registration of vital statistics in 1919.66
Despite these official interpretations of the increased deaths during the campaign, one
cannot overlook the fact that the treatments could not prevent continued re-infection due
to the poor sanitary conditions. Although the campaign reduced the numberofworms each
infected individual harboured, the rate of re-infection increased over time with the
unabated soil pollution. This was the major factor that was never adequately tackled on the
estates. Almost every annual report ofthe project directors and field doctors referred to the
poorsanitary conditions, but the problem was always brushed offwith temporary solutions
by the planters and the government. Given the transparent importance of sanitation in
controlling hookworm disease, it is hard to comprehend why the construction of latrines
on the plantations was not given priority in the hookworm control campaign. It is in
response to this question that the remainder of the paper is addressed.
V
First the respective situation of, and the relationship between, the planters and the
government will be briefly reiterated. Leaving aside lengthy commentary on the callous
64 RA, op. cit., note 57 above, pp. 23-4.
65 Ibid., p. 23.
66 RA, Numberofdeathsaccording tohospital reports inplaintaition distric-tswihereainchvlostoniisis campaign
was conducted, 1911-1920, RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 48; also Philips, op. cit., note 10 above, p. 297.
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treatment of those in their employ, it should be clear that the planters' reluctance to
construct latrines rested principally on the issue of profit. They knew that it would cost
them a certain amount of money to build the necessary permanent latrines and they
perceived no economic or legal impediments to disregard such needs. The sanitation
problem caused no serious labour shortages, owing to the ready supply of workers from
India. Further, the planters enjoyed relative immunity from prosecution for failure to
comply with even those sanitary regulations already in place. For its part, having begun to
experience a degree of cordiality with the planters by the time of the programme's
implementation, the government seems to have been reluctant to press its legal hand over
the matter ofsanitation. The arrival of the Rockefeller "philanthropic" medicine provided
the government with some means to move away from its mutually confrontational
relations with the planters in a way which would not jeopardize its dubious laissez-faire
policy. The government was decidedly unwilling to accept responsibility for sanitary
services as it reasoned this might-in the perception ofthe planters-appear to be a retreat
from its own (self-serving) policy of non-interference. Realizing that endorsement of the
hookworm campaign was necessary, given the influence of the Planters' Association on
the Colonial Office in London, the government of Sri Lanka eventually acquiesced,
conceiving no harm in playing a supportive role in the campaign. But the government's
stated goal oferadicating hookworm disease was not its primary objective. This led to the
curious result that it spent what was for that time a considerable amount of money on a
largely futile exercise.
Finally, what accounts for the Rockefeller doctors' own failure to pursue more
vigorously the importance of sanitary reforms on the plantations? Owing to past
experience, they were well-informed about the crucial relationship between latrines and
the hookworm infection. This is often evident in their reports; for example, referring to the
experience in Puerto Rico, a staff member of the IHB recalled:
Although Puerto Rico has a population ofapproximately one million and has already spent
$347,000 on hookworm, we found an infection rate over 90 per cent in 2000 examinations
at various test points among the rural population. Fully 80 per cent of the houses have no
latrines. The trouble is that all the money was spent on relief measures and very little
effective sanitation was accomplished.67
Frequent reference is made by the project director and the field doctors to the necessity of
latrines on the plantations in Sri Lanka. The temporary latrines which were constructed
during the campaign lasted only a few weeks, after which the problem of sanitation again
became the major concern. Reflecting a considerable level offrustration, one field doctor
reported:
We are doing our best to prevent soil pollution on the various estates, ... At the present
time, the [latrine] structures are unserviceable and unsafe. They are not used except perhaps
in one or two instances. It is very desirable that new structures of permanent materials be
constructed as soon as convenient. It is considered important that as little wood, mud walls,
or cadjan as possible be used. It is advisable that stone, bricks, or tiles be used.68
67 RA, AnchNlostomiasis operations in Ceylon, 1919, pp. 6-7, RG. 5, Se. 3, Box 193.
x RA, Sanitary conditions on the estates, 1919, p. 14, RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 47.
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From the beginning of its sojourn in Sri Lanka, senior representatives of the IHB
employed formidable diplomatic tact in bringing together the two hostile parties-the
government and the Planters' Association-in order to initiate the campaign on the
plantations. To a certain extent it would seem that this rhetorical current of diplomacy
became the predominant tenor ofdiscourse, imbuing all subsequent relations. And since it
was so important in initiating the campaign it was difficult to interrupt. As a result, the
representatives ofthe IHB were required to play the role ofmediator orbrokerbetween the
government and planters, which compromised their ability to advocate sanitary reforms
more forcefully in conjunction with treatments.69 Moreover, despite the field doctors'
continual reports of the sanitary problems on the plantations, there was no significant
effort on the part ofhigh-ranking officials to convert these concerns into tangible reforms.
However, there is another dimension to the failure of the hookworm campaign in Sri
Lanka. It is that, being both trained and socialized by the theories and values of Western
medicine, the medical personnel involved were products of, and enamoured with, the
emerging biomedical model. The IHB did not pursue the question of latrines forcefully
with either the government or the planters because its aim was to cure the disease. From
the very beginning, the success of the campaign was measured in terms of cure, reduced
absenteeism, increased productivity and increased fertility on the plantations. These were
the specific results that Dr Heiser promised to the chairman of the Planters' Association
when he first met him in 1915. When absenteeism was reduced immediately after the first
year ofthe campaign, the enthusiasm was overwhelming-despite the early indications of
re-infection. Again in 1919, the IHB did not insist upon sanitary reforms on the estates
when the government refused to enforce the existing sanitary regulations. Instead, it went
ahead with expanding the campaign to other plantation districts while fully aware of the
problem of re-infection on estates where treatment had been completed. The IHB
recognized the importance of latrines as an essential step toward the eradication of
hookworm disease. Project directors and staff members of the IHB often talked about the
prevention of the disease. However, because they were overwhelmed by the "power" of
medicine they soon sidestepped the issue when the government and the Planters'
Association insisted upon continuing treatment.
For the Rockefeller Foundation, eradication of hookworm disease meant not only the
increased productivity of labour but also a wider acceptance ofWestern cultural values by
the people of European colonies. This was considered to be crucial for the future of
American economic and political interests in those countries. It is ironic that the money
spent on treatment could easily have provided a sufficient number of latrines on the
plantations.70 In spite of the persistent suggestions by the field doctors regarding the
69 The government often acknowledged that the unconditional commitment of the IHB to carry out treatment
on the estates would help to "heal the break" between the government and the planters. It was widely believed by
high-ranking government officials that any support the IHB provided to the planters would help to convince them
that the government was behind such support because, as Dr Rutherford, PCMO, put it, "the aid could not have
been granted without Government consent". The eventual outcome, according to the PCMO, was a "more kindly
reciprocal feeling between planters and Government". RA, Letter, May 24, 1920, from Dr W. P. Jacocks to Dr
Victor Heiser, No. 1132, RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 47.
70 It is interesting to note how little it would cost to construct a regular outdoor pit latrine in Sri Lanka at that
time. In 1930, requesting a grant ofRs. 5000 from the IHB, Dr R. Briercliffe, the director ofMedical and Sanitary
Services in Sri Lanka wrote: "Rupees 5000 would I think enable us to provide at least 5000 latrines. With 10
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urgency of sanitation, the prevention of hookworm disease was never-not in an
unequivocal manner, at least-considered an indispensable part of the agenda. This is
because the main concern of the senior officials of the IHB was to "demonstrate" the
curative power ofWestern medicine. In conclusion, it can be suggested that the control of
hookworm disease through sanitary reforms was less alluring to the senior officials of the
IHB and, consequently, was judged by them to be a less impressive display of Western
culture in the ongoing publicity campaign.
borers at work we could probably install 3(0() latrines a year. It would be an excellent demonstration to
Government of what can be done with a little money .". (Incidently, one U.S. dollar was equivalent to three
rupees at that time.) RA, letter, October 6, 1930, from Dr R. Briercliffe to Dr W. P. Jacocks, No/Y/1667, RG.
1. 1, Se. 462, Box 1.
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